What if your Kubernetes cluster simply refused to run unsigned images? I spent some time experimenting with enforcing image provenance in a small Kubernetes setup using MicroK8s. The idea was simple: Only container images with valid cryptographic signatures are allowed to run in the cluster. For this I used: GitLab CI/CD (build + signing pipeline) Cosign / Sigstore (image signing) Kyverno (admissi
User types "android" into your search box. That's 7 API calls if you wired it the way I did the first time. A few months later I shipped a pagination bug where every infinite-scroll fetch flashed a full-screen loader for half a second. And then there was the Settings screen that needed to refresh the Dashboard when the user changed theme — but Settings couldn't import Dashboard without a circular
You asked Claude to build a feature. It worked. You shipped it. Six weeks later, you're adding something related, and nothing makes sense anymore. The code is technically correct but completely opaque. You can't remember why anything was structured this way. Claude can't figure it out either — it starts guessing, and the guesses start breaking things. This is the scenario I keep seeing. And it's n
Most teams I have worked with have one auth test in their suite. It looks like this: test('valid token verifies', () => { const token = signSync({ sub: 'user-1', aud: 'api://backend' }, secret); const result = verify(token, options); expect(result.valid).toBe(true); }); That test is fine. It is also a smoke test, not a regression suite. It catches the case where verification is completely b
The on-call alert at 02:14 said auth_5xx_rate spiked from 0.01 to 31.4. Not a deploy window. Not a traffic spike. Just thirty-one percent of authenticated requests failing for ~four minutes, then back to baseline. The cause was a JWKS rotation on the issuer side. New keys came in. Old keys went out. Caches in our service didn't refresh fast enough. Tokens signed with the new key were rejected beca